David Lagziel

January 2026

CURRICULUM VITAE

- **Personal Details**

Name: David Lagziel
Date and place of birth: November 7, 1983, Israel
Address and telephone number (work): Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), Economics Department,
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Address and telephone number (home): Hakeren 3 St., Herzelia, 050-8565752

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4497-9535

- **Education**

B.Sc. - 2007-2010, Tel Aviv University (TAU), Physics and Mathematics

M.Sc. - 2010-2011, TAU, Mathematics
Name of advisor: Ehud Lehrer
Title of thesis: Regret-free strategies with partial delayed information

Ph.D. - 2012-2017, TAU, Mathematics
Name of advisor: Ehud Lehrer
Title of thesis: Optimal Design of Games in Financial Problems

- **Employment History**
  - October 2025 – Present (*planned till Oct. 2027*): Visiting professor, Dept. of Economics, University of Toronto
  - March 2021 – Present: Senior Lecturer (tenured), Department of Economics, BGU
  - November 2017 – March 2021: Lecturer, Department of Economics, BGU

- **Professional Activities**

(a) Positions in academic administration
2019-2024, Head of B.A. teaching committee, Economics, BGU
2018-2019, Economics Research Seminar co-organizer

(b) Professional functions outside universities/institutions
2019, Organizer of the 11th Israeli Game-Theory Conference, BGU
2019, Organizer of the 4th Aumann Lecture, BGU

(c) Significant professional consulting

(d) Editor or member of editorial board of scientific or professional journal

(e) Ad-hoc reviewer for journals
*American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
*Management Science
*Games and Economic Behavior
*Sports Economics Review
Journal of Economic Theory
Mathematics of Operations Research
International Journal of Game Theory

Building and Environment

Ad-hoc reviewer for grants
*Binational Science Foundation (BSF)
Israel Science Foundation (ISF)

(f) Membership in professional/scientific societies
2019-present, American Economic Association
2016-present, Econometric Society
2014-present, Game-Theory Society

• Educational activities

(a) Courses taught
*Microeconomic Theory and Applications, B.A. – Toronto University
*The Israeli Economy, B.A. - BGU
*Seminar in Economic Theory – Bayesian inference and Info. Economics, B.A. - BGU
Statistics A for Economists, B.A. - BGU
Statistics B for Economists, B.A. - BGU
Calculus for Economists, B.A. - BGU
Mathematics for Economists, M.A. - BGU
Mathematics for M.A. in Financial Economics, M.A. - IDC

(b) Research students

M.A.

1. Bar Dagan, M.A., 2020, ``Wage confidentiality in employment contracts with heterogeneous friction,", BGU
2. Chen Yanoos, M.A., 2020, ``Wage secrecy in labor contracts with heterogenous workers," BGU
3. Lotem Ikan, M.A., 2022, ``The distributions of opinions on social networks," BGU
4. Aviv Nataf, M.A., 2022, ``All-pay auctions with ties," BGU
5. Gili Almagor, M.A., 2022, ``The effect of participation rate on working hours and productivity" BGU
6. Zohar Baruch, M.A., 2024, ``How to recommend under competitive conditions," BGU
7. Ron Sade, M.A., 2024, ``Political manipulations under pressure," BGU
8. *Tohar Erev, M.A., 2025, ``A public discussion game with multidimentional opinions," BGU
9. *Matan Levintov, M.A., 2025, ``Unraveling the dynamics of consensus and polarization in public debate," BGU
10. *Shahar Yacouel, M.A., present, ``The duration of pluralistic ignorance caused by conservative lag," BGU

• **Awards, Citations, Honors, Fellowships**

(a) Honors, Citation Awards
2019, BGU, Galat prize for excellence in teaching
2017, Israeli chapter of the Game-Theory Society, Maschler Prize
2013-2017, TAU, Top 100 junior faculty members (TA) list
2013-2017, TAU, Dean's Award for excellence in teaching
2013, TAU, The Rector's Award for excellence in teaching
2013, TAU, The Ruth and Nathan Eliosef Award (teaching award)

2012, TAU, Award of excellence in M.Sc. studies

(b) Fellowships

2011-2017, TAU, 140,000$, Graduate school fellowship

• **Scientific Publications**

a) H-index: 3 by ISI; 5 by Google Scholar.
b) Total number of citations of all articles: 15 by ISI; 56 by GS.
c) Total number of citations without self-citations: 11 by ISI; 42 by GS.

(a) Authored books

(b) Editorship of collective volumes

(c) Refereed chapters in collective volumes, Conference proceedings, Festschrifts, etc.

Notes:
Economics publications below list authors in strictly alphabetical order and *not* by relative contribution. All PIs share equal contribution.
AIS indicates the Article Influence Score, which is superior to IF.
GS indicates raw Google Scholar citations (includes citations by working papers or citations of the working paper version of the cited paper).
In Economics, all authors are considered PIs with similar contributions.

(d) Refereed articles and refereed letters in scientific journals

1. **Lagziel**[PI] D. and E. Lehrer[PICA]. 2015. Approachability with delayed information. *Journal of Economic Theory*. 157:425-444.
   Citations: 2 (ISI), 6 (GS);
   AIS: 2.398, 57/601 Economics (Q1).

2. **Lagziel**[PICA] D. and E. Lehrer[PI]. 2018. Reward schemes.
   Games and Economic Behavior. 107:21-40.
   Citations: 3 (ISI), 5 (GS);
   AIS: 1.239, 122/601 Economics (Q1).

3. **Lagziel**[PICA] D. 2019. Credit auctions and bid caps.
   Games and Economic Behavior. 113:416-422.
   Citations: 2 (ISI), 3 (GS);
   AIS: 1.239, 122/601 Economics (Q1).

4. **Lagziel**[PI] D. and E. Lehrer[PICA]. 2019. A Bias of Screening.
   American Economic Review: Insights. 3:343-356.
   Citations: 3 (ISI), 13 (GS);
   AIS: 9.094, 12/601 Economics (Q1).

5. **Lagziel**[PI] D. and E. Lehrer[PICA]. 2021. Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
   Economic Theory. 71: 483–504.
   Citations: 1 (ISI), 1 (GS);
   AIS: 0.851; 181/601; Economics (Q2).

6. E. Einy[PI] and O. Haimanko[PI], and **Lagziel**[PICA] D. 2022. Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium.
   Economic Theory. 73:91–119
   Citations: 3 (ISI), 10 (GS);
   AIS: 0.851; 181/601; Economics (Q2).

7. **Lagziel**[PICA] D. and E. Lehrer[PI]. 2022. Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals.
   American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14 (4):1-24
   Citations: 1 (ISI), 8 (GS);
   AIS: 3.274; 38/601; Economics (Q1).

8. ***Lagziel**[PICA] D. and E. Lehrer[PI]. 2022. Performance Cycles.
   Economic Theory. 77 (4):999-1024
   Citations: 0 (ISI), 0 (GS);
   AIS: 0.851; 181/601; Economics (Q2).

9. *C. Cohen[PI], **Lagziel**[PI] D., O. Levi[PI] , and A. Sela[PICA]. 2023. The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes.
   Journal of Mathematical Economics. 105:1-16
   Citations: 0 (ISI), 2 (GS);
   AIS: 0.627; 240/601; Economics (Q2).

10. *T. Blumkin[PI] and **Lagziel**[PI] D. and Y. Margalioth[PICA]. 2023. A Case for Pay Secrecy.
    American Law and Economics Review. 25 (1):268-299
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 2 (GS);
    AIS: 0.625; 242/601; Economics (Q2).

11. *T. Blumkin[PICA] and **Lagziel**[PI] D. 2024. Asymmetric market power and wage suppression.
    Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 126 (1):38-59
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 0 (GS);
    AIS: 1.068; 140/601; Economics (Q1).

12. ***Lagziel**[PI] D., E. Lehrer[PI] and O. Raveh[PICA]. 2025. Resource Windfalls and Political Sabotage: Evidence from 5.2 Million Political Ads.
    American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Forthcoming
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 1 (GS);
    AIS: 1.573; 91/601; Economics (Q1).

13. *L. Ikan[PI]**, Lagziel**[PICA] D. and O. Raveh[PI]. 2025. Resource windfalls, Connectivity, and Political Polarization.
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Forthcoming
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 4 (GS);
    AIS: 2.756; 48/601; Economics (Q1).

14. ***** **Lagziel**[PICA] **D.** and Y. Tsodikovich**[PI]**. 2025. Working with AI: An Analysis for Rational Integration.
    Games and Economic Behavior. 153 (1): 254-267
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 0 (GS);
    AIS: 1.239, 122/601 Economics (Q1).

15. * **Lagziel**[PICA] **D.** and E. Lehrer[PI]. 2025. Dynamics of Multi-Stage Screening *Economic Modelling.* Forthcoming
    Citations: 0 (ISI), 0 (GS);
    AIS: 0.778; 192/601; Economics (Q2).

(e) Published scientific reports and technical papers

(f) Unrefereed professional articles and publications

(g) Classified articles and reports

• **Lectures and Presentations at Meetings and Invited Seminars**

(a) Invited plenary lectures at conferences/meetings

(b) Presentation of papers at conferences/meetings (oral or poster)

1. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2012, Approachability with delayed information, The 4th Israeli Game Theory Conference, TAU.
2. **Lagziel** D., 2015, Credit Auctions and Bid caps, The 7th Israeli Game Theory Conf., TAU.
3. **Lagziel** D., 2015, Credit Auctions and Bid caps, Conference in Honor of Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University.
4. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2016, Reward Schemes, Games 2016, Maastricht University.
5. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2017, Reward Schemes, The 9th Israeli Game Theory Conference, Technion.
6. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, Performance Cycles, The 10th Israeli Game Theory Conference, IDC.
7. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, Performance Cycles, The 29th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University.
8. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, A Bias of Screening, ORSIS 2018, BGU.
9. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2019, A Comparison of Noisy Signals in Screening, ORSIS 2019, Shfayim.
10. *L. Ikan**, Lagziel** D. and O. Raveh, 2023, The Indoctrination Game, The 12th Israeli Game Theory Conference, TAU.
11. *A. Aradhye**, Lagziel** D. and E. Solan, 2024, Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents, The 13th Israeli Game Theory Conference, Bar-Ilan University.
12. *L. Ikan**, Lagziel** D. and O. Raveh, 2024, The Indoctrination Game, The 4th Durham Economic Theory Conference, Durham University.

(c) Presentations at informal international seminars and workshops

(d) Seminar presentations at universities and institutions

1. 2012, Mathematics, TAU, Approachability with delayed information.
2. 2014, Mathematics, TAU, Credit auctions and bid caps.
3. 2015, Mathematics, TAU, Reward Schemes.
4. 2015, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Credit auctions and bid caps.
5. 2015, Business School, TAU, Reward Schemes.
6. 2016, Mathematics, TAU, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
7. 2016, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Reward Schemes.
8. 2016, Economics, TAU, Reward Schemes.
9. 2016, Economics, Hebrew University, Reward Schemes.

10. 2016, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Reward Schemes.
11. 2016, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Reward Schemes.
12. 2017, Economics, BGU, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
13. 2017, Economics, Haifa, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
14. 2018, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, A Case for Pay Secrecy.
15. 2018, Economics, TAU, A Case for Pay Secrecy.
16. 2018, Mathematics, TAU, A Bias of Screening.
17. 2018, Economics, BGU, Restraining Labor-Market Competition Through Wage Secrecy.
18. 2019, Economics, Manchester University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
19. 2019, Business school, Glasgow University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
20. 2019, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
21. 2019, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
22. 2019, Mathematics, TAU, Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium.
23. 2021, Economics, Aix-Marseille, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
24. 2021, One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
25. *2022, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Dynamic Screening
26. *2022, Mathematics, TAU, Dynamic Screening
27. *2022, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Dynamic Screening
28. *2023, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, The Indoctrination Game
29. *2023, Mathematics, TAU, The Indoctrination Game
30. *2023, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, The Indoctrination Game
31. *2024, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Comparison of Oracles
32. *2024, Mathematics, TAU, Comparison of Oracles
33. *2024, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
34. *2024, Economics, BGU, Comparison of Oracles
35. *2024, Economics, Hebrew University, The Indoctrination Game
36. *2024, Economics, Universite Paris Dauphine, The Indoctrination Game
37. *2025, Management, Bar-Ilan University, Comparison of Oracles
38. *2025, Rationality Center, Hebrew University, Comparison of Oracles
39. *2025, Economics, University of Western Ontario, Comparison of Oracles
40. *2025, Economics, University of Toronto, Comparison of Oracles

• **Patents**

• **Research Grants** (IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, OLD TO NEW):

(a) Competitive Grants listed by VATAT - such as ISF, BSF, GIF, BARD, NIH, DFG, ICRF, HFSP, DIP, Ministry of Health, EU framework program, Ministry of Science Technology and Space.

1. 2019-2021, ISF, Blumkin[PI] T. and **D. Lagziel[PI]**, Wage Secrecy in Labor Contracts, 32,000$ per year, 64,000$ total.
2. *2023-2027, ISF, **D. Lagziel[PI]**, The indoctrination Game, 28,500$ per year, 114,000$ total.

(b) Competitive Grants – such as other granting agencies, and various government offices, industry, etc.

(c) Other Grants – such as Prizes, fellowships, and internal university support, e.g.,

- **Present Academic Activities**

Research in progress

1. ***Lagziel[PI] D.**, E. Lehrer[PI] and T. Wang[PI]. 2025. Comparison Of Oracles: Part I. *To be submitted.*
2. ***Lagziel[PI] D.**, E. Lehrer[PI] and T. Wang[PI]. 2025. Comparison Of Oracles: Part II. *To be submitted.*
3. ***Lagziel[PI] D**. and E. Lehrer[PI]. 2025. Constrained Mediation: Bayesian Implementability of Joint Posteriors. *To be submitted.*

Books and articles to be published

1. ***Lagziel[PI] D.**, O. Raveh[PI] and Y. Zhang[PI]. 2025. Do campaign contributions fuel political sabotage? *Under Review in the International Economic Review.*
2. *N. Goldstein[PI], **Lagziel[PI] D.**, O. Raveh[PI]. 2025. Political Rational Inattention: A New Measure with an Application to Political Polarization. *Under Review in The Economic Journal.*
3. *A. Aradhye[PI], **Lagziel[PI] D.**, and E. Solan[PI]. 2025. Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents. *Under review in AEJ:Microeconomics.*

- **Additional Information**

- **Synopsis of research, including reference to publications and grants in above lists**

I am a Senior Lecturer of Economics at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. My research lies at the intersection of game theory, information economics, and political economy, with a particular focus on the design of strategic environments under informational frictions. Over the past few years, my research agenda has evolved along two interrelated lines: the study of public debate and polarization, and statistical decision-making through screening models. Much of my recent work focuses on strategic environments shaped by contests, conflict, and political competition, with applications ranging from the design of contests to the dynamics of public discourse.

Political Economy, Public Debate, and Polarization

Building on contest-theoretic tools, I have explored political environments where agents compete over influence rather than tangible rewards. A key motivation stems from *"The Role of the Second Prize in All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogeneous Prizes"* (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023), where we analyze how asymmetric rewards shape equilibrium behavior, and from *"Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium"* (Economic Theory, 2022), where we provide new foundations for equilibrium robustness in games with incomplete information, establishing conditions for the uniqueness of correlated equilibria. These theoretical insights have broader implications for strategic design in uncertain environments and naturally extend to political arenas where candidates face uneven stakes and asymmetric incentives.

In *"Resource Windfalls and Political Sabotage"* (American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2025), we provide theoretical and empirical evidence that resource windfalls significantly increase negative campaigning in U.S. gubernatorial elections. Using over 5 million political ads, we show that higher resource windfalls lead to a substantial rise in campaign negativity, driven primarily by corruption. These findings are supported by a two-player tournament in which political players can campaign in positive and negative manners, proving that sabotage intensifies in symmetric electoral environments.

In *"Resource Windfalls, Connectivity, and Political Polarization*" (Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2025), we develop a model of public debate in which resource windfalls spark contests over public opinion. We show that in highly connected societies—where political engagement is intense—positive economic shocks (such as resource windfalls) lead to elevated polarization by enabling extremists to dominate the discourse. This research builds on a theoretical framework developed under a four-year grant I received from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF).

More recently, in *"Political Rational Inattention: A New Measure With an Application to Political Polarization"* (2025), we propose a new measure of rational inattention in political environments. We show how voters' elevated attention, combined with strategic communication by information providers, shapes patterns of polarization.

Finally, in *"Do Campaign Contributions Fuel Political Sabotage?"* (2025, under review), we examine how campaign financing affects the incentives for political sabotage. We show how higher political contributions increase the stakes of political contests, leading to higher levels of negative campaigning.

Screening and Statistical Decision-Making

My second line of research focuses on screening environments—settings where a decision maker selects elements from a population based on noisy information. I am particularly interested in

identifying counter-intuitive features of screening processes and in designing mechanisms that improve the selection quality.

In *"A Bias of Screening*" (AER: Insights, 2019), we show that stricter screening thresholds may paradoxically reduce the average quality of selected elements. This occurs because unbiased noise interacts with screening thresholds in a way that distorts the selection process. Building on this, in *"Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism*" (Economic Theory, 2021), we propose a novel market design solution where transferable deposits are used to mitigate screening failures in portfolio management settings.

In *"Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals*" (AEJ: Microeconomics, 2022), we develop a framework for comparing noisy signals using a contraction mapping in screening problems. Doing so, we show that adding independent noise—effectively introducing a "lucky coin toss"—can improve screening outcomes under threshold strategies.

Our recent work, "*Dynamic Screening"* (R&R in Economic Modelling), studies multi-stage screening processes where elements are repeatedly evaluated. We show that introducing an additional screening stage may deteriorate selection quality unless the screening is applied extensively across many stages.

This research agenda naturally led us to explore environments in which decision makers interact with AI advisors. In "*Working with AI: An Analysis for Rational Integration*" (R&R in Games and Economic Behavior), we develop a model of decision making in which both the human decision maker and the AI possess informative private signals. We show that the correctness of the decision process is not monotonic in the participants' expertise levels: a less accurate AI or a less accurate decision maker may, counterintuitively, lead to improved decision-making.

Research Outlook

Looking ahead, my research will continue to develop these two interrelated lines, with an emphasis on information frictions in Bayesian game (*"Comparison of Oracles*", with Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang) and on "*Polarization and sabotage"* (with Ohad Raveh). I am particularly interested in the emerging challenges posed by the governance of public discourse, and the design of strategic environments under informational frictions.

- **Teaching Statement**

In recent years, my teaching has focused mainly on mathematical courses, while in the past year I have expendaded to more applied ones. I am currently teaching a course titled: "*The Israeli Economy"*, which is a course that examines the structure, development, and policy challenges of Israel's economy, combining macroeconomic analysis with current economic debates. I am also teaching a *Seminar in Economic Theory* focusing on Bayesian inference and Information Economics, where students engage directly with recent theoretical research and apply advanced tools of statistical decision-making to economic models.

In addition, I regularly teach quantitative core courses such as *Calculus for Economists* (B.A.) and *Mathematics for Economists* (M.A.). In these courses, I emphasize building intuition alongside technical proficiency, aiming to equip students with the mathematical tools required for economic analysis while maintaining a focus on economic interpretation and application.

Across all courses, I strive to create a clear and supportive learning environment, encourage interaction, and use relevant examples that link abstract theory with real-world phenomena. I believe that good teaching is grounded in clear communication, responsiveness to student feedback, and a continuous effort to connect formal analysis to intuitive economic reasoning.